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Abstract
This paper proposes a model of entrepreneurial turnover highlighting a
non-monotone relationship between technological change and ability-biased
sorting into entrepreneurial types. Entrepreneurial decisions are examined in
a two-stage model under uncertainty in which entrepreneurs decide to aban-
don a project and start a new venture depending on technological change and
on ability. We show that technological change affects the quality distribu-
tion of entrepreneurship by increasing the ex-ante number of entrepreneurs
undertaking the most efficient projects and decreasing the post-entry num-
ber of entrepreneurs of low-quality firms who choose to continue their initial
business. A higher rate of technological change is therefore likely to induce a
cleansing effect on entrepreneurial activity and to alter the market perception
of business creation.
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1 Introduction
The creation of new businesses and the decline or market exit of less productive
firms are often regarded key to business dynamism and economic growth in OECD
countries. New firms play an important role as job creators and firm turnover allows
reallocating resources from low to higher productivity units. In fact, the entry and
exit of firms in fact accounts for approximately 30 % of total productivity growth
in OECD countries (OECD, 2003). Yet, survival rates of new firms are strikingly
low in many sectors. As documented by Scarpetta et al. (2002), only 30% to
40% of entering firms survive beyond the first two years of life. Explaining the
start-up of new firms, their extremely diverse chances of survival and their different
post-entry performance is therefore an important challenge for the understanding of
entrepreneurship and growth.
Empirical evidence on business dynamics in Europe and in the US remains con-
troversial but several stylized facts have reached a consensus in the recent past.
First, at the aggregate level the rate of entrepreneurial activity is very different
across OECD countries. In 2001 this rate varied from 7.2% in Europe (4.5% in
Belgium, 7% in France, 7.5% in the UK, 12% in Ireland) to 12.2% in the US. Sim-
ilarly, between 1995 and 2000, the annual average rate of new enterprise formation
ranged from 6.5% in Denmark to 11.7% in France and 15.7% in Germany (Euro-
pean Commission, 2002). Second, at the industry level there are large differences
across sectors. In particular, entry rates are very high in information and commu-
nication technology (ICT)-related industries (20% on average in computer-related
service activities, which is two times higher than the entry rate in business ser-
vices activities - see Brandt, 2004). In addition, entry and exit rates are highly
correlated across industries suggesting that firm turnover is characterized by search
and experimentation (Bartelsman et al., 2005; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2006). In-
deed, were firm turnover determined only by profit expectations (as a response to
sub- or supra-normal profits), creation and destruction rates should be negatively
correlated. In opposition, the observed correlation between entry and exit rates,
together with high early failure rates, suggest that firm turnover is characterized by
market churning and entry mistakes as hidden costs of exploring of entrepreneurial
opportunities. Finally, at the firm level there exists a relationship between firms ex-
ante characteristics and post-entry performance. In particular, the likelihood of new
firms survival and post-entry performance tends to decrease with firm size and credit
constraints and to increase with the technological environment and entrepreneur’s
education and human capital (Bates, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997). Also, hetero-
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geneity across entrepreneurial types is significant. Entrepreneurial ventures appear
as a rather heterogeneous aggregate where innovative entrepreneurs meet passive
followers, over-optimist gamblers and escapees from unemployment (Santarelli and
Vivarelli, 2006).
In this paper we focus on two characteristics of business dynamics which seem
to reach a consensus in the literature:
• Firm entry and exit exhibit strong heterogeneity and significant differences
across countries, industries and entrepreneurs.
• New firm creation rests on a process of search and experimentation, with early
failures, market churning and turbulence.
Many arguments have been developed in the literature to explain differences
in entrepreneurship across countries: individual characteristics, institutional con-
straints (credit market frictions, administrative costs and barriers to entry), social
environment (market’s perception of failure), competition, technology and growth,
business cycles, information asymmetry, corporate governance (for a recent compre-
hensive survey see Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2006). For Lazear (2002), the determi-
nants of entrepreneurship lie in education as entrepreneurs are “jacks-of-all-trades
who may not excel in any one skill, but are competent at many”. Hence, individu-
als with experience of many different roles are more likely to become entrepreneurs
(a positive effect between human capital and entrepreneurship is often observed in
empirical studies, see e.g. Wagner, 2005). A less specialist and more versatile ed-
ucation should therefore help to spur the level of entrepreneurial activity. Yet, one
may argue that the level of education alone does not provide a sufficient explana-
tion of cross-country differences in entrepreneurial dynamism. Indeed, many more
technology-intensive businesses are undertaken in the US compared to Europe1, even
though these economies have comparable levels of skills and human capital2. The
determinants of cross-country differences in business dynamics are therefore more
complex.
1According to Sapir et al. (2004), 50% of new pharmaceutical products are introduced by firms
that are less than 10 years old in the United States, versus only 10% in Europe. Similarly, 12%
of the largest US firms by market capitalisation at the end of the 1990s had been founded less
than twenty years before, against only 4% in Europe, and the difference between US and European
turnover rates is much bigger if one considers the top 500 firms.
2The labor force participation rates of individuals aged 25-64 with a tertiary level of education
in 1998 was 86.3% in OECD countries, 87.7% in the US and 87.3% in European economies (OECD,
1999). Similarly, the average annual employment growth of high-skilled workers over the 1995-2001
period equals 2.79% both in the US and in Europe (OECD, 2004).
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For Scarpetta et al. (2002), greater financing possibilities combined with low
administrative and financial costs in the US are likely to stimulate entrepreneurs
with innovative projects and capacities to start on a small scale and then expand
rapidly if successful. In Europe on the contrary, high entry and adjustment costs
may rather stimulate a pre-market selection of business plans with less market ex-
perimentation. This literature essentially explains firm turnover (ex-ante selection
versus post-entry experimentation) by external barriers to entry. In turn, differences
in business dynamism may stem from differences in credit and labor market condi-
tions3, institutional constraints such as administrative costs, protection of creditors
rights or levels of law enforcement (see e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Bhattacharya
and Chakraborty, 2004; Giannetti, 2003). Social interactions also matter in the
decision to become an entrepreneur because they create social norms and affect rep-
utation and tolerance toward failure (Landier, 2006; Gromb and Scharfstein, 2001).
For example, career concerns can induce inefficient continuation of investments as
entrepreneurs may be reluctant to abandon their initial project when this is per-
ceived as recognizing an error was made thereby generating an adverse signal for
ability (Boot, 1992; Holmstrom, 1999). Similarly, entrepreneur’s failure may be
highly stigmatized (implying a high cost of capital after failure) or considered as
part of the learning process, leading to different types of entrepreneurial regimes
and possibly too much or too little entrepreneurship in equilibrium (Landier, 2006;
Gromb and Scharfstein, 2001).
Barriers to entry and institutional and social norms undeniably represent es-
sential determinants of business dynamics in OECD countries4. However, the high
variability of entry and exit rates across sectors and the within-industry correlation
between entry and exit rates suggest that additional factors do matter for busi-
ness creation and destruction. From this perspective, the literature on firm churn-
ing stresses the contribution of producer-level turnover to aggregate productivity
growth. This approach proposes models of selection where industries are depicted
as collections of heterogeneous-productivity producers and where productivity levels
are linked to performance and survival in the industry (see Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson
and Pakes, 1995; Melitz, 2003). In these models, low productivity firms are less likely
3In a different perspective, a growing literature considers the financing of new ventures through
venture capital and focuses on the mechanisms behind financing arrangements such as the allocation
of control rights and the staging of investments over time (Berglof (1994), Gompers (1995), Hellman
(1998)). Here, our model abstracts from the details of venture capital financing and uses a simpler
contracting model.
4According to Djankov et al. (2002), the start-up process may take up to 66 days and 16
different legal and administrative steps in France while requiring 7 days and 4 steps in the United
States, and such differences are definitely likely to inhibit business creation (see Fonseca et al.,
2001).
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to survive than their more efficient counterparts creating productivity-survival link
as a crucial driver of productivity growth. This literature provides a comprehen-
sive analysis of firm within-industry reallocation and of the contribution of entry
to aggregate productivity growth (see Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2005).
The present model explores a different but complementary mechanism to explain
the links between entrepreneurs’ selection or churning and productivity growth. We
indeed assume that productivity gains of new firms are not equally higher (which is
supported by empirical evidence on entry failures), and that such gains depend on
the returns to entrepreneurial talent which depend themselves on technical change
and credit conditions. In other words, the choice of creating a firm and the quality
of the project developed depend on the level of entrepreneurial difficulty, which is
driven by the rate of technological change and credit market conditions.
The idea that technical change complements ability in the returns to entrepre-
neurial activity is borrowed from the literature on skill-biased technical change (See
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante, 2005 or Acemoglu, 2002 for excellent surveys5).
Intuitively, when the technological environment is more turbulent, individual abil-
ity becomes more important in the returns to entrepreneurial creation compared
to social capital. As in the literature on norms, institutions and entrepreneurship
mentioned above, the firm’ environment plays an important role in the likelihood
of success. But here we focus on the firm’s technological environment rather than
institutional or social environment. In addition, we know from empirical evidence
that new firms are not always the most productive and entry failures are numerous.
We therefore allow for both heterogeneity in nascent businesses creation and new
business projects implementation. Individual heterogeneity in business creation then
leads to an endogenous sorting of individual to entrepreneurial types, depending on
the level of technological change. In turn, we also let the rate of technical change de-
pend on the quality of new projects, thereby creating a feedback mechanism between
firm creation and destruction, credit market condition and endogenous growth.
More precisely, we propose a model in which entrepreneurs differ in their ability
5In this literature, the allocation of individuals over social positions (becoming an entrepre-
neur or a worker) would depend on the level of entrepreneurial difficulty which is driven by the
rate of technological growth (see Hassler and Rodriguez-Mora, 2000). We extend this argument
by considering that the attractiveness of entrepreneurial projects to talent depends on the return
to ability-biased technical change, and more precisely on the complementarity between ability,
technical change and credit conditions. Hence, we depart from this literature and analyze the
determinants of the refinancing decision and the existence of an entrepreneurial selection mecha-
nism. By focusing on the sorting of individuals to different (“nascent”) entrepreneurial types, we
highlight that the endogenous sorting of individuals to entrepreneurial types depends not only on
the complementarity between ability and growth but also on credit market conditions captured
through banks’ interest rates.
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to implement business enterprises and the rate of technological progress comple-
ments ability in the returns to entrepreneurial decisions. Two types of uncertain
entrepreneurial projects may be chosen by individuals: a “high adaptative”(higher
quality) project, suited for entrepreneurs able to take correct decisions in rapidly
changing environments, and a “low adaptative”(lower quality) project, suited for
lower levels of ability to run efficiently projects in changing environments. Projects
last for two stages, a research (experimentation) stage and a development stage.
The success of the research venture is determined both by the entrepreneur’s ability
and by the technological environment. We show that the experimentation phase
whereby firms may decide to either continue or liquidate and start a new project,
leads to a cleansing effect on business creation. Our model therefore implies both
pre-entry selection in the choice of the project and post-entry experimentation dur-
ing the refinancing decision. In addition, both types of decisions depend on the
complementarity between individual ability, the technical environment and the cost
of capital. This leads to heterogeneity in start-up financing of small and innovative
firms and different levels of entrepreneurial activity across countries. The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows. Section ?? presents the basic set up. Section
?? describes the research and development stages. Section ?? and ?? examine the
equilibrium and main results of the model. Section ?? concludes.
2 Basic set up
2.1 Overview
The model has three dates, t=0,1,2. All agents are risk neutral and the risk-free
interest rate is normalized to zero. There is no discounting. The economy is com-
posed of a continuum of entrepreneurs and investors. Projects last for two periods:
the first period is a research stage in which entrepreneurs implement their business
idea, the second period is a development stage in which production takes place.
At date 0, entrepreneurs are endowed with one research project each and lack any
source of finance. Bankers are endowed with plenty of funds but are short of research
ideas.
At date 1, after observing privately the business’s probability of success, entrepre-
neurs decide to either continue the existing business or liquidate it and ask for a
refinancing to start a new one. Banks decide whether to grant a new loan to second
timers entrepreneurs and set interest rates. At the end of the second period, cash
flows and repayments are realized.
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The sequence of events may be summarized as follows:
• t = 0:
Entrepreneurs ask for loans
Entrepreneurs choose between two types (qualities) of business creation
Banks set interest rates
Business’s probability of success is private information to entrepreneurs
• t = 1:
Entrepreneurs choose whether to continue their initial business or liquidate it
and start a new one
Banks decide to refinance the entrepreneur or not
• t = 2: Cash flows and repayments are realized
2.2 Contractual variables
In the research stage, the decision to become an entrepreneur implies to choose
among two types of firms or projects: a “high-adaptative” (high quality - type H)
or a “low-adaptative” (low quality - type L) firm. In the type H firm, entrepreneurs
can spread their ability advantage in the sense that adaptativity to technological
environment (and therefore the firm’s returns) increases with individual ability. In
type L firms, entrepreneurs have to spend time learning and adapting to complex-
ity. This learning process increases the firm’s returns, but reduces available time for
running it and therefore decreases the probability of success of the business which
is discovered at the end of the research stage.
In the development stage, a final good is produced using two different types of in-
termediate goods: goods produced by continued firms (labelled j = c) and goods
produced by refinanced firms (labelled j = r). Hence, we denote the inputs in the
production of intermediate goods as “refinanced firms’ goods” and “continued firms’
goods”.
The financing contract between the entrepreneur and the investor, which is
signed at date 0, specifies an initial investment for the research venture of $1, gen-
erates a cash flow Vj and final repayment Rj at date 2 (j = c, r)
6.
6The financing contract can be interpreted as debt or equity. Under risk neutrality, a null
transfer in case of termination is not restrictive. Since the abandoned project has a zero reservation
value, whether the investor can seize it or not is irrelevant.
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Each entrepreneur can run only one business at a time. At date 1, after observing
privately the business’s probability of success, entrepreneurs choose whether to con-
tinue the initial business (j = c) or liquidate it and ask for a refinancing to start
a new business (j = r)7. In this case, the initial business is terminated and its
liquidation value is normalized to zero. The new business again requires an initial
investment of $1 and yields a cash flow of Vj at date 2. Hence, the new business
becomes a one-period project. Banks decide whether to grant a new loan to second
timers entrepreneurs at an interest rate of Rr.
If the business is abandoned or generates no cash flow at date 2, the repayment
to the bank is 0. We thus assume that the entrepreneur is liable for payments to the
lender only to the extent of current revenues. Therefore, the firm is restricted to a
nonnegative cash flow. Hence, we only need to characterize the repayment for the
first-timers (those who carry on the initial project until date 2) and second-timers
(entrepreneurs who abandon the first business and start again at date 1), Rc and
Rr. We assume that at date 0, the average project has a positive net present value
8.
The following figure reproduces the timing and the variables of the model. In
the research stage, if we denote by θ the firm’s type, θ = H,L, the expected value of
a firm, entrepreneurial payoffs and probabilities of success are denoted respectively
as V θ, λθ and piθ, θ = H,L. In the development stage, entrepreneurs choose to
continue the initial business or abandon it and ask for a refinancing to start a new
one. The firm’s expected values, entrepreneurial payoffs and probabilities of success
are denoted as V θc , λ
θ
c and pi
θ
c , θ = H,L, for continued businesses and as Vr, λr and
pir for refinanced businesses.
7At date 1, banks can distinguish between new entrants and failed entrepreneurs who are willing
to start a new business. We thus omit news entrepreneurs applying for a loan at the beginning of
the second period.
8Formally, see assumption 3 below .
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3 The research and development stages
3.1 The research stage
At date 0, there is a continuum of mass one of wealthless entrepreneurs who may
create “high-adaptative” (type H) or “low-adaptative” (type L) firms. The com-
plementarity between ability and technology in the individuals’ decision to become
entrepreneurs of type H or type L firms relies on the idea that basic skills become
rapidly obsolete in a rapidly changing environment. The most able individuals in-
deed have a comparative advantage in choosing to become an entrepreneur of type
H firms from too perspectives. On the one hand, having marginal greater ability is
rewarded in a type H firm, even in a stationary environment (where the rate of tech-
nological progress is constant) whereas learning and adapting to new environments
is rewarded in type L firms only when growth improves and provided that time is
spent to “absorb” new technologies. On the other hand, technological progress ex-
erts an erosion effect on the probability of success of a type L firm whereas it does
not affect that of a type H firm.
In other words, we propose a model of “nascent ”entrepreneurship (i.e. the entre-
preneurs who are currently taking explicit steps to start a new business) in which
individuals make the choice of creating a new venture and, as in Lazear’s view of
jack-of-all-trades, those who have sufficient knowledge in a variety of areas to put
together the many ingredients needed for survival and success in a business will
choose a type H firm, while those who have not these skills will choose to create a
type L firm in which they will not be able to spread their ability advantage9.
The firm’s expected value V θ depends on the ex ante continuation value Vc (in
case of refinancing) and on the entrepreneur’s adaptative capacity10
ρθ:
V θ = Vc · ρθ, θ = H,L
and the entrepreneur’s expected payoff is defined as:
9Our definition of nascent entrepreneurship focuses on the ability to adapt to a changing en-
vironment but a more complete theory would encompass more individual characteristics like for
example risk-aversion, previous employment status, regional characteristics or gender. Since we
focus on the interplay between ability, technical change and credit condition, we rely on a more
reduced-form to characterize entrepreneurship.
10This formulation may be related to the literature on entrepreneurial choices that dates back
to Lucas (1978) or more recently Jovanovic (1994). In its most basic exposition, individuals are
confronted with a choice of earning their income either from wages earned through employment in
an incumbent firm or else from profits accrued by starting a new firm.
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piθ = λθ · V θ, θ = H,L
where λθ denotes the probability of success of the current business, which is
discovered privately by the entrepreneur after setting up the firm but before date 1.
This probability represents a measure of the project’s survival rate.
Type H firms are run by entrepreneurs able to make difficult decisions in
complex environments. They adapt instantaneously to new environments and the
time needed to learn new technologies is null. Their adaptative capacity depends
only on their individual ability: ρH = h(ai) with 0 < h(ai) < 1, h
′(ai) > 0, and
where the entrepreneur’s ability ai is distributed uniformly over the unit interval
11.
A type H firm’s expected value is then defined as:
V H = Vc · h(ai)
In type H firms, the most able individuals have the highest adaptative capacity
whatever the rate of technological progress, the time needed to adapt to new tech-
nologies is null and the entrepreneur’s available time is entirely devoted to run the
firm. The probability of success of a type H firm is constant and defined by λH = λ,
where 0 < λ < 1. This assumption captures the idea that in type H firm, having
marginally greater ability is rewarding, and that others factors such as luck or the
technological environment do not affect the probability of success and survival on
the market.
Definition 1. Rate of technical change The rate of technical change is denoted
by γ where 0 < γ < 1.
In type L firms, entrepreneurs do not have the same competence to take correct
decision in rapidly changing environments and learning is necessary to adapt to
the technological environment. We assume that the learning process involves an
opportunity cost such that the higher the rate of technological progress γ, the higher
the time spent learning the new environment, therefore the higher the adaptative
capacity of type L entrepreneurs, but the lower the time remaining for running
efficiently the project. We normalize entrepreneurs’ time to 1, so that in L type
firms, a fraction δ · γ of this time is devoted to adapt to new technologies and the
remaining fraction 1 − δγ is devoted to run the project. Given that the rate of
technical change γ is such that 0 < γ < 1, then the following restriction is imposed
on the parameter δ:
11Qualitative results are not affected by a more general distribution function for ability as long
as it is continuous.
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Assumption 1. 0 < δγ < 1
The adaptative capacity of entrepreneurs running type L firms is proportional
to the rate of technological progress γ as follows: ρL = δ · γ. The firm’s expected
value then is defined as:
V L = Vc · δγ
In type L firms, entrepreneurs must spend time to learn and adapt to changing
environments and the marginal return to ability is null. The higher the time spent
learning, the higher the adaptativity, but the lower the time available for running
the firm (1 − δγ). In turn, the probability of success of type L firm is given by
λL = λ · (1− δγ). Hence, there is an erosion effect due to technological progress for
type L firms which affects the business’s probability of success (or survival).
We assume that the average project has a positive net present value:
Assumption 2. Project’s positive net present value: λ · (2− δγ) · V θ > 1
In sum, expected entrepreneurial payoffs are given by:
piL(ai) = λ · (1− δγ) · δγ · Vc (1)
piH(ai) = λ · h(ai) · Vc (2)
At date 0, given the above expected payoffs, entrepreneurs choose to engage in
a type H firm rather than in a type L firm if and only if, given their ability and
the rate of technological progress, the expected payoff from running a type H firm
is higher than the expected payoff from running a type L firm, that is:
piH(ai) ≥ piL(ai)⇐⇒ λ · h(ai) · Vc ≥ λ · (1− δγ) · δγ · Vc
Given that 0 < λ < 1 and 0 < δ · γ < 1, this inequality implies that there is
a unique threshold level of ability, a∗, such that 0 < a∗ < 1. All individuals with
ability above the threshold, a∗ choose to run type H firm, while all individuals with
ability below a∗ run type L firms: piH(a∗)) ≥ piL(a∗)), where:
a∗ = h−1(δγ(1− δγ)) (3)
Since the population mass is normalized to one and ability uniformly distributed
over the unit interval, the number of type L entrepreneurs is a∗ and the number
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of type H entrepreneurs is 1 − a∗. Since function h(.) is continuous and strictly
increasing, the inverse function h−1 is also continuous and strictly increasing.
3.2 The development stage
At date 1, entrepreneurs choose whether to continue their initial business (j = c) or
liquidate it and start a new one (j = r). Banks decide to refinance the entrepreneur
or not.
We consider that the probability of success for refinanced firms is the same inde-
pendently of firms’ initial types. In other words, refinanced firms are closed down
and a new business starts. Hence, the entrepreneur generates the same level of out-
put whatever his ability. The probability that the business succeeds determines the
distribution of payoffs that are generated at date 2. At this date, conditional on
success, each entrepreneur running a firm of type θ will receive a net cash flow of
piθj = λ
θ
j · (Vj − Rj) where Rj and Vj represent the repayment to the bank and the
value of each type of business. If the business is abandoned or fails at date 2, no
repayments are made to the bank. The nonnegativity constraint on entrepreneur’s
cash flows requires the following assumption:
Assumption 3. Non-negative cash flows: Vj ≥ Rj, j = c, r
The probabilities of success of each type of business enterprises are labelled λr
for a refinanced firm, λHc for a continuing firm of type H and λ
L
c for a continuing
firm of type L. We assume that λr = λ
L
c · κ, with κ ≤ 1. Hence we have:
λHc = λ > λ
L
c ≥ λr (4)
The expected payoff for each type of entrepreneur then writes:
piHc = λ
H
c · (Vc −Rc), piLc = λLc · (Vc −Rc), pir = λr · (Vr −Rr) (5)
with Rj and Vj the interest rates and the firms’ values. We assume that a
continued project has a positive net present value:
Assumption 4. Continued project’s positive net present value:
(λHc + λ
L
c )Vc > 1
After substituting for pic and pir from equations (??) and (??) in appendix (??),
entrepreneurial payoffs from running each type of firm are given by:
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piHc = λ
H
c
1− α
α
· xc − λHc ·Rc (6)
piLc = λ
L
c
1− α
α
· xc − λLc ·Rc (7)
pir = λr
α
1− α · xr − λr ·Rr (8)
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Resources constraints
Firms differ in their type (H or L) and at date 1 and we can thus distinguish three
categories of firms: those that need a refinancing, firms of type L that are continued
and firms of type H that are continued. The population mass is normalized to one,
there is a proportion 1− a∗ of type H entrepreneurs. We denote by Hc (respectively
Lc) the fraction of entrepreneurs with type H (respectively type L) who continue
their business. Since the number of entrepreneurs is normalized to 1, the resources
constraints write:
nHc + n
L
c + nr ≡ 1 with

nHc = (1− a∗) ·Hc
nLc = a
∗ · Lc
nr = (1− a∗) · (1−Hc) + a∗ · (1− Lc)
(9)
where nHc (respectively n
L
c ) is the number of type H (respectively type L) firms
that are continued and nr is the number of firms that are refinanced.
4.2 Refinancing decisions
We consider a first-time entrepreneur’s decision to continue or abandon his initial
business at date 1. An equilibrium is determined by the strategy (continuation or
abandon) of a first-time entrepreneur who observes the probability of success of his
current business and by the cost of capital, Rc and Rr for first-timers and second-
timers. Entrepreneurs of type L choose to continue their business as long as the
expected income, piLc , is higher than that of a refinanced firm, pir. In equilibrium,
this condition is binding, implying that the number of entrepreneurs of type L
who choose to continue their business satisfies the following indifference condition:
piLc = pir. Regarding entrepreneurs of type H, the assumption that λ
H
c > λ
L
c implies
that piHc > pi
L
c .
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Refinancing decisions in turn satisfy the following rule:
piHc > pi
L
c = pir (10)
This rule implies that, all firms of type H choose to continue and firms of type
L are indifferent between continuing or refinancing, that is:
Hc = 1 (11)
piLc = pir⇐⇒λLc
1− α
α
· xc − λLc ·Rc = λr
α
1− α · xr − λr ·Rr (12)
Taking into account the resources constraints (??), the market clearing condition
writes:
xc = λ
H
c n
H
c + λ
L
c n
L
c , xr = λrnr (13)
Substituting for (??) into (??) finally allows determining the number Lc of firms
of type L that choose to continue:
⇔ Lc =
α
1−ακ
2 + a
∗−1
a∗
1
1−δγ
1−α
α
+ Rc−κRr
λ(1−δγ)a∗
α
1−ακ
2 + 1−α
α
(14)
4.3 Banks’ decision
Banks maximize their profits and offer interest rates to first-timer entrepreneurs
(those who carry on the initial project until date 2) and to second-timers (the ones
who ask for a refinancing at date 1). The loan contract is parameterized by Rc
for the entrepreneurs who continue their initial project and by Rr for those who
want to start again an investment project. At the beginning of the first period, if
the loan contract specifies a promised repayment such that lenders get an expected
return at least equal to the amount of the initial loan, $1, the loans are granted.
If banks receive repayment lower than the initial loan, they refuse to finance the
entrepreneur’s investment project. Banks set an identical single rate for both types
since they can not distinguish between the two types of entrepreneurs at a time
when the loan is granted.
The loan contract involves liquidation for all payment lower than the face value
of the debt, Rc and Rr. Since liquidation destroys all profits from a project, in-
cluding the entrepreneur’s repayment, both lenders and borrowers receive zero pay-
ments whenever there is liquidation. This implies that entrepreneurs will honor
their obligation of repayment whenever their projects deliver sufficient return and
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in equilibrium, there is liquidation only when the value of the project’s cash flow is
zero. Entrepreneurs behave as price takers, that is, they can not affect the interest
rates charged by the bank. They always borrow from the competing bank offering
the lowest interest rate.
We have shown that all firms of type H continue rather than refinance. In
addition, the number of firms of type L that choose to continue (Lc) is given by
equation (??). In that case, the number of type L firms which ask for a refinancing
is given by: a∗(1−Lc). In comparison, the number of entrepreneurs who continue is
given by (1− a∗) ·Hc+ a∗ ·Lc. We now have to determine equilibrium interest rates
charged by the bank in period 2.
For a second-timer, in a competitive financial market the bank’s break-even rate
satisfies:
Rr =
1
λr
(15)
where λr is the probability of success for a type L second timer, so that the
entrepreneur can meet his obligation of repayment toward the bank.
At the first period, banks charge an interest rate Rc prevailing for first-timers.
The bank’s break-even rate for a loan made to a randomly selected entrepreneur at
the first period insures that the unconditional probability of success λHc +λ
L
c equals
the initial investment. Solving for Rc yields:
Rc =
1
λHc + λ
L
c
(16)
Note that Rc < Vc from assumption 4. From equation (??) we get λ
H
c > λ
L
c ≥ λr.
In turn we have Rc < Rr, which implies that the interest rates charged for a failed
entrepreneur who restarts a project is greater than the prevailing interest rates for
a first timer entrepreneur.
The incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that type L firms with a low
probability of success choose to continue is:
a∗LcλLc (Vc −Rc) > a∗(1− Lc)λr(Vr −Rr)
In equilibrium, second-time entrepreneurs can refinance their business only if,
Rr < Vr. Otherwise, no feasible payment allows the creditor to break even. If,
Rr > Vr, entrepreneurs willing to start again their business are unable to refinance.
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Consequently, the incentive compatible constraint can be rewritten as: a∗LcλLc (Vc−
Rc) > 0, which holds from assumption 4. Hence, the market does not refinance failed
businesses. This situation arises when the expected value of the initial business for
failed entrepreneurs is negative, i.e., λLc · Vc < 1.
Without altering the qualitative result of the model but to simplify exposition
we will consider for the rest of the paper that h(ai) = ai, that is:
a∗ = h−1(δγ(1− δγ)) = δγ(1− δγ) (17)
Definition 2. Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is characterized by equations (??), (??), (??), (??),
(??) and (??) defining the values of a∗, nHc , n
L
c , nr, Hc, Lc, Rcand Rr, that is:
1. At date 0, all individuals with ability below a∗ run type L firms, with:
a∗ = δγ(1− δγ)
2. At date 1, the number of firms of type L that choose to continue is given by:
Lc =
α
1−ακ
2 − 1−a∗
a∗
1
1−δγ
1−α
α
+ Rc−κRr
λ(1−δγ)a∗
α
1−ακ
2 + 1−α
α
3. The interest rate charged to continued businesses is given by:
Rc =
1
(λHc + λ
L
c )
=
1
λ(2− δγ)
4. The interest rate charged to refinanced businesses is given by:
Rr =
1
λr
=
1
λκ(1− δγ)
Lemma 1: A continuation equilibrium exists if:
a∗LcλLc (Vc −Rc) > a∗(1− Lc)λr(Vr −Rr)
If Rr > Vr, entrepreneurs willing to start a new business at date 1, are not refi-
nanced.
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5 The cleansing effect of growth and the selection
of business enterprises
This section derives the main results of our model. We first analyze the optimal
decision of firm entry and exit when the rate of technical change is exogenous. This
allows characterizing how ability-biased technical change affects firm turnover and
firm quality. We then endogenize the rate of technical change to examine the reverse
relationship, that is how firms entry and exit affect the economy’s growth rate. This
feedback loop from firm turnover to growth is crucial to understand the contribution
of firm turnover to productivity growth and therefore to provide a complete analysis
of firm churning and selection.
5.1 Exogenous technological change
When technical change is exogenous the model allows analyzing how the economy’s
exogenous growth rate influences firm churning from a comparative statics perspec-
tive. In particular, we examine which type (quality) of firm project is more likely
to be created and successful following an exogenous increase (or decrease) in the
growth rate. The following propositions develop the model’s analytical results and
are illustrated with numerical simulations in appendix ??.
Proposition 1 describes the impact of growth on entry decisions, that is on the
projects quality in the first stage (pre-entry decision).
Proposition 1. Growth and firms’ types.
Faster growth, in the sense of a higher rate of technical change increases (respectively
decreases) the number of entrepreneurs that choose to run type H firms when γ >
γ˜ = 1/2δ (respectively γ < γ˜ = 1/2δ).
Proof: see appendix ??. 
Proposition 1 states that above a threshold level, as the rate of technological progress
γ increases, the number of entrepreneurs running a type H firm (1 − a∗) increases
as well. Hence, faster technical change induces a selection effect on the number of
type H projects that are undertaken in the first period. Type H firms are considered
as high-adaptative because they are run by entrepreneurs able to take the correct
decision in difficult situations. As the rate of technological change accelerates, this
confers a comparative advantage to entrepreneurs running a type H firm compared
to those running a type L firm. In other words, a higher growth rate increases the
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entry rate of high quality firms above a threshold growth level.
This proposition captures the stylized fact that a change in technology affects
which agents have a comparative advantage in entrepreneurship. Assuming that
innovative activities are more likely to be undertaken by type H entrepreneurs, the
view that technological progress favors skilled agents is supported by a consider-
able literature on skill-biased technical change (see Acemoglu, 2002 or Hornstein
et al., 2005). In our model, rapid technological progress increases the comparative
advantage of the most able entrepreneurs to run firms and endogenously raises the
number of type H firms. Moreover, this result is also in line with the evidence show-
ing that innovation-prone environnements tend to affect the quality distribution of
entrepreneurship. Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2004) observe that individuals
who work in areas where they are more exposed to a network of venture capitalists
(such as Silicon Valley and Massachusetts) are more likely to spawn new firms.12
Here, individuals who work in fast-growing environments are more likely to create
high quality firms.
To analyze the impact of growth on the refinancing (post-entry) decisions, we
need to examine its effect on interest rates. The impact of the growth rate on the
cost of capital is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Growth, interest rates and composition effects
The interest rates charged to failed entrepreneurs who restart their initial business,
Rr is greater than the prevailing interest rates for first timer entrepreneurs, Rc. Both
interest rates are increasing in the rate of technical change.
Proof: Rr > Rc is obtained using equations (??) and (??). The derivative of Rr
and Rc with respect to γ is immediate (see appendix ?? for details). 
Note first that both interest rates, Rr and Rc, are increasing with the rate of
technical change: growth spurts increase the cost of capital for all firms. Interest-
ingly, this growth-induced credit cost is driven by ability-biased entrepreneurship.
Indeed, equations (??) and (??) imply that faster technological change increases
the relative return to ability for high quality firms (compared to low quality firms).
This improved comparative advantage translates into a lower probability of success
for low quality entrepreneurs (due to the erosion effect that affects the business’s
12The authors show that firms located in Massachusetts have spawning levels of 24% and this
level increases by 38% for Silicon Valley. This is consistent with the literature on agglomeration
economies that shows that there might be knowledge spillovers across individuals, and individual
productivity may be higher in areas where human capital is more concentrated (Glaeser et al.,
1992).
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probability of success) and for refinanced firms. This higher failure risk then exerts
an upward pressure on interest rates. In other words, faster growth erodes entre-
preneurs’ ability to run correctly type L or refinanced firms, the failure risks and
interest rates of which adjust upward.
The fact that ability-biased technical change affects business creation through
the cost of capital yields an interesting implication in terms of credit rationing.
Indeed, the interest rate charged to first timer entrepreneurs is lower than the interest
rate charged to second timer entrepreneurs, which suggests that the cost of capital
rises when the credit history of an entrepreneur includes a failure. Because of the
uncertainty about the borrower’s type, lenders downgrade their beliefs about the
borrower’s quality when default occurs. High-quality borrowers therefore expect a
lower cost of capital than low-quality borrowers. The latter then are more likely to
be credit-rationed (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). For many entrepreneurs, building up
a good credit history through hard work and smart investing is crucial as borrowers
with unfavorable credit histories (e.g. past bankruptcies and delinquent payments)
typically have poorer access to credit and at poorer terms (Vercammen, 1995). In
particular, recently created firms have short credit history and therefore lower credit
ratings than firms which have been trading for a long time. As a result, the latter
benefit from a lower cost of capital. Available empirical evidence reveals that in fact,
an established firm with a good track record is less likely to have its credit rating
downgraded than a recent start-up, without an established credit record (Japelli
and Pagano, 2000). Our result supports the fact that the cost of capital increases
with early failures.
We know examine the impact of the growth rate on the post-entry decision to
continue the initial project or liquidate the firm and ask for a refinancing. We know
from equation (??) that high quality firms will always continue whatever the level of
technical change. An increase (or a decrease) in the growth rate will however affect
the number of low quality projects that are refinanced, as described in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Selection and the cleansing effect of growth
Faster growth, in the sense of a higher rate of technological change, reduces the
number of entrepreneurs of type L that choose to continue their initial business
when γ > γ˜ = 1/2δ.
Proof: see appendix ??. 
Proposition 3 states that when the rate of technical change is above the threshold
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level γ˜, the number of entrepreneurs of type L that continue their initial business
decreases when growth accelerates. The exit rate of low quality firms is therefore
higher13. Moreover, we know from (??) that the number of type H entrepreneurs
who continue their initial business is maximal (Hc = 1). Hence, the average value
of businesses and the pool of entrepreneurs are of high quality14. This result implies
a self-selection mechanism both at the ex-ante (choice of quality) and post-entry
(refinancing) decision stage and can be interpreted in several directions.
A first interpretation of this self-selection process is that growth induces a cleans-
ing effect on entrepreneurial activity. Given that there is a threshold level above
which self-selection occurs, only countries or sectors (like ICT sectors) with the high-
est rates of technical change will experience the highest entry rates of high quality
firms. On the contrary, for lower levels of growth, the number of high quality projects
will decline as growth increases. This result suggests a U-shaped relationship be-
tween the entry rate of high quality firms and the exit rate of low quality on the
one hand, and the economy’s technological dynamism (measured by its growth rate)
on the other hand. This result is supported by recent empirical evidence reported
in Wennekers et al. (2005). Using data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
from 36 countries, these authors indeed observe a U-shape relationship between the
country’s rate of entrepreneurial creation and its level of innovation.
Another interpretation of this self-selection process is to consider that entrepre-
neurial dynamism is favored by a tolerant business climate toward failure. Here,
social norms and failure tolerance might affect entrepreneurship in the sense that
when business failure is weakly stigmatized, terminating a project does not damage
entrepreneurs’ reputation and low productivity (quality) projects are more easily
liquidated. In this sense, the impact of a higher growth rate on the number of low
quality projects that are continued could be interpreted in the light of a low stigma
toward failure: when growth reduces the number of continued L type projects, busi-
ness failure seems less stigmatized. This mechanism is in line with a large body of
evidence. In particular, the American’s entrepreneurial regime seems to consider
failure as a valuable entrepreneur’s learning experience (Saxenian, 1994), whereas
the fear of failure would prevent more than 35% of Europeans from starting a new
business (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2002).
13In the simulations (??), for all negative values the optimal decision is simply Lc = 0. This
illustrates the fact that no low-adaptative firms are continued when entrepreneurs receive bad news
about the firm’s future prospects.
14Note that for γ < 1/2δ, we do not have a simple analytical result and this case is only illustrated
graphically with numerical simulations, which are reproduced in appendix ??.
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Finally, this self-selection process may also be interpreted in the light of learning
models (see e.g. Jovanovic, 1982). In these models of firm dynamics, only by start-
ing a new firm and observing the subsequent performance is a nascent entrepreneur
able to learn about her endowment of entrepreneurial talent and entrepreneurs with
lower skills ultimately exit, which resembles a simple creative destruction mech-
anism. Here, an acceleration in the growth rate will accelerate learning, thereby
improving the selection process. Both at the theoretical and at the empirical level,
a considerable literature (in an endogenous growth or labor economics perspective)
supports this effect of growth on entrepeneurial learning by means of a creative de-
struction process (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1992; and Mortensen and Pissarides,
1998).
We have analyzed so far the impact of growth on the creation and destruction
of businesses of different quality. Under exogenous technical change, we have shown
that rapid technological growth affects the comparative advantage of entrepreneurs,
induces self-selection and filters out the least efficient types for high levels of growth
both ex-ante and at the post-entry refinancing decision stage. We now turn to
the analysis of endogenous technical change. This extension of the model will allow
examining the contribution of entrepreneurship to economic growth and the feedback
loop from business turnover to technological dynamism.
5.2 Endogenous technological change
In this section we endogenize the rate of technological change to analyze the feedback
mechanism from the allocation of entrepreneurial talents to innovation and growth.
Formalizing this mechanism is crucial since business turnover can contribute up to
30% of aggregate productivity growth in OECD countries (OECD, 2003).
As before, there are two periods (or stages): entrepreneurs develop their business
idea in the research stage and production occurs in the development stage. The final
good sector and the intermediate goods sector are described in appendix ??. We
now assume that the rate of technological progress is a positive linear function of the
number of type H entrepreneurs who pursue their business idea over both stages:
γ = ε · λHc nHc with ε > 0 (18)
This assumption captures the idea of learning-by-doing: as entrepreneurs of type
H are the most able to adapt and spread their ability advantage, they contribute to
increasing knowledge and growth in the economy.
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Given the equilibrium values obtained in section ??, we can substitute for the
values of λHc and n
H
c to get the following endogenous growth rate:
γ = ελ(1− δγ + δ2γ2)
The existence of a positive equilibrium rate of technological progress requires a
further restriction on the value of the parameter ε:
Assumption 5.
ε < ε˜ ≡ 1
λ(1− δ + δ2)
This assumption provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a positive solution
to the above equation that governs the growth rate in this economy.
Proposition 4. Endogenous technological progress
Under Assumption 1 and 5, there exists a unique equilibrium rate of technological
progress γ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that
γ̂ =
1 + ελδ +∆1/2
2ελδ2
with ∆ = ((1 + ελδ)2 − 4ε2λ2δ2 > 0.
The equilibrium rate of technological change increases with the probability of suc-
cess of the business project (λ) and the spillover rate of learning-by-doing (ε) and
decreases with the adaptative capacity of entrepreneurs of type L (δ).
Proof: see appendix ?? 
It is not surprising that the rate of technological change positively depends on
the spillover rate of learning-by-doing (i.e. on the increase in the efficiency of the
learning process) and on the projects’ probability of success (i.e. on the learning
externality or learning curve). More interestingly, since the probability of λ also
affects the composition of the pool of entrepreneurs in the first period (it reduces the
ability threshold a? above which individuals choose to run type H projects), there is a
positive feedback loop on the quality distribution of entrepreneurial types. A rise in
λ improves the overall quality (survival rates) of projects, which affects interest rates
(see proposition 2) and translates into a better ex-ante selection of high quality types
(more high quality projects are chosen ex-ante) and a better post-entry selection of
low quality projects (less low quality projects are refinanced ex-post), which fosters
the growth rate. In other words, under endogenous technical change, higher survival
rates improve the ex-ante and post-entry quality distribution of entrepreneurship via
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the credit-growth channel and the positive relationship between entry rates of high
quality firms and exit rates of low quality firms.
While the main mechanisms from growth to business turnover are the same as in
the model with exogenous technical change, the novelty here lies in the mechanisms
from business dynamics to growth. The contribution of firm turnover to aggregate
growth indeed relies on a multiplier effect: any parameter that positively influ-
ences growth and/or the returns to high quality projects will increase the number
of ex-ante high quality projects and decrease the number of post-entry low quality
refinanced projects. In turn, the ability threshold of high quality ventures goes down
implying higher quality projects ex-ante, and the cost of capital increases ex-post
implying higher post-entry entrepreneurial quality. This has a multiplicative im-
pact on growth. This positive feedback loop suggests a strong correlation between
entry rates of high quality (high productivity) firms, exit rates of low quality (low
productivity) firms and a high contribution of business turnover to aggregate pro-
ductivity growth. Those three mechanisms are largely supported by recent empirical
evidence in OECD countries. The positive link between high quality (or produc-
tive) entering firms and low quality exiting firms is confirmed by the observation
of a positive correlation between entry and exit rates in OECD countries, together
with the fact that exiting businesses have lower productivity than incumbents or
entrants (Brandt, 2004; Foster et al., 2005).
Finally, we can note that the rate of technical change decreases when the spillover
rate of learning-by-doing ε goes down, which occurs for instance due to knowledge
obsolescence. Through its negative impact on the rate of technological progress,
knowledge obsolescence hence negatively affects the comparative advantage of type
H entrepreneurs. This leads to a higher stigma of failure and thereby a higher
number of entrepreneurs of type L who choose to continue their initial business.
Finally, the higher the marginal adaptativity cost of type L entrepreneurs δ, the
lower the rate of technical progress. A higher value of δ increases both the adap-
tative capacity of type L firms and the erosion effect on the probability of success.
Overall, the erosion effect dominates and an increase in δ affects business creation
by improving the comparative advantage of type H entrepreneurs and reducing the
number of entrepreneurs of type L firms who choose to continue their business.
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6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the quality distribution of firm turnover by focusing on the
complementarity between credit conditions, technological environment and individ-
ual ability to run firms. We develop a two-stage project development set up in which
growth affects the ex-ante and post-entry quality distribution of entrepreneurship.
We show that rapid technological change affects business dynamics via three main
channels. First, an acceleration in the growth rate improves the comparative advan-
tage of individuals in running high quality firms. Above (below) a threshold level,
the number of entrepreneurs who choose to run the most efficient projects increases
(decreases) with the growth rate. Second, a higher rate of technical change increases
the failure risks of low quality entrepreneurs, which raises the cost of capital for new
ventures. Lastly, above the threshold level, faster growth reduces the number of
low quality firms who choose to continue their initial business. This cleansing effect
on entrepreneurial activity highlights that higher levels of growth may reduce the
stigmatization of failure: when failure is considered as part of the learning process,
entrepreneurs abandon more easily an inefficient project. Moreover, when techno-
logical change is endogenous, the correlation between entry rates of high quality
(high productivity) firms, exit rates of low quality (low productivity) firms and the
contribution of business turnover to aggregate productivity growth are reinforced.
Our approach focuses on the complementarity between technical change and
ability to create and run a business venture to explain the quality distribution of
nascent entrepreneurship in an economy. To explain the large divergence in the
rates of nascent business creation across countries (from 12.4% in the US to 5.5%
in Germany and France, and below 4% for most other European countries) our
model focuses on a specific characteristics of nascent entrepreneurship based on the
adaptability to a changing environment. Several extensions could be considered to
enlarge this analysis. In particular, introducing other factors such as competition
between firms could yield insightful results and constitutes an area for our future
research.
24
7 Appendix
7.1 Description of the development stage
In the development stage, we consider an economy composed of two sectors: a final
good sector and an intermediate goods sector. Intermediate goods are used as factors
of production in the final good sector. The final good is the numeraire, it is produced
in a competitive environment using two different types of intermediate goods: goods
produced by continued firms (labelled c) and goods produced by refinanced firms
(labelled r).
The production function is a Cobb-Douglas:
y = xαc x
1−α
r , 0 < α < 1 (19)
where y is the final good, xc is the quantity of continued firms’ goods and xr is
the quantity of refinanced firms’ goods.
The profit maximization problem by a representative firm in this sector leads to
the following inverse demand for inputs:
pc =
∂y
∂xc
= αxα−1c x
1−α
r (20)
pr =
∂Y
∂xr
= (1− α)xαc x−αr (21)
where pc denotes the price of continued firms’ goods and pr the price of refinanced
firms’ goods. Consequently, the equilibrium price of each intermediate good, xc and
xr is given by its marginal product.
Intermediate goods are produced using final good as input. Given the inverse
demand for intermediate goods in the final good sector (??) and (??) and given
that the price of the final good is normalized to 1, the optimization program for
continued firms, c and for refinanced firms, r writes:
max
xc
pcxc − xc = αxαc x1−αr − xc.
max
xr
prxr − xr = (1− α)xαc x1−αr − xr.
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from where we obtain the profit-maximizing prices and the flow of profits for
each type of business:
pc =
1
α
, pr =
1
1− α (22)
Vc =
1− α
α
· xc, Vr = α
1− α · xr
7.2 Proofs
7.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is made for a general set of functions h(.), in particular when h(x)=x as
in (??).
Note that function h(.) is continuous and strictly increasing. Then, the inverse
function, h−1 is also continuous and strictly increasing. From equation (??) we get
∂a∗
∂γ
= h−1
′
(δγ(1− δγ)) · δ(1− 2δγ)
where h−1
′
(.) > 0.
Given that the number of entrepreneurs that choose to run type H firms is equal
to 1− a∗, we have
∂H
∂γ
> 0⇔ (1− 2δγ) < 0
7.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) After simple manipulation, the interest rates defined by equations (??) and (??)
write:
Rr =
1
λκ(1− δγ)
Rc =
1
λ(2− δγ)
After some simple algebra we have
Rr −Rc = 1− δγ + 1− κ(1− δγ))
λκ(1− δγ)(2− δγ)
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We thus get Rc < Rr, which implies that the interest rates charged to a failed
entrepreneur who restarts his project is greater than the prevailing interest rates for
a first timer entrepreneur.
(ii) The derivative of Rr and Rc with respect to γ is immediate from equations
(??) and (??): both interest rates are increasing in the rate of technical change.
7.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting for (??) and (??) into (??) and rewriting yields :
Lc = Λ · {Φ−Ψ(a∗(γ), γ)− Ω(a∗(γ), γ)}
where given (??)
a∗(γ) = δγ(1− δγ)
Λ =
1
α
1−ακ
2 + 1−α
α
Φ =
α
1− ακ
2
Ψ(a∗(γ), γ) =
1− a∗(γ)
a∗(γ)
1
1− δγ
1− α
α
Ω(a∗(γ), γ) = − Rc − κRr
λ(1− δγ)a∗(γ) =
1
λ2(1− δγ)2(2− δγ)a∗(γ)
Deriving with respect to γ then gives:
(Lc)
′ =
∂Lc
∂γ
= Λ{−(Ψ)′ − (Ω)′}
(Ψ)′ =
∂Ψ(a∗(γ), γ)
∂γ
=
1− α
α
−(a∗)′
(a∗)2
1
1− δγ +
1− α
α
1− a∗
a∗
δ
(1− δγ)2
(Ω)′ =
∂Ω(a∗(γ), γ)
∂γ
=
−(a∗)′(1− δγ)(2− δγ) + a∗δ(1− δγ) + 2a∗δ(2− δγ)
λ2(a∗)2(1− δγ)3(2− δγ)2
(a∗)′ =
∂a∗(γ)
∂γ
= δ(1− 2δγ)
¿From these equations, we can state that whenever (a∗)′ < 0, then (Lc)′ < 0.
In other words, when γ > 1/2δ, Lc decreases with the growth rate γ. The opposite
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case where γ < 1/2δ does not yield a simple analytical result and is only illustrated
graphically with numerical simulations, reproduced in appendix ??.
7.3 Numerical simulations with exogenous technical change
To run the numerical simulations, the parameters values are then given as follows:
α = 0.97, δ = 5, λ = 0.9, κ = 1. The following figures illustrate the links we
established between the different variables explored in this paper. They also serve
as an illustration of the propositions stated above.
We then get the following curves corresponding to the different effects highlighted
in propositions 1 to 3. Figure a and b draw a∗ and H as functions of γ. We observe
that a∗ is a inverted-U shaped curve and H is a U-shaped curve. Regarding figure c,
plotting Lc: when γ > γ˜ = 1/2δ = 0.10, Lc decreases with the growth rate. On the
other hand, when γ < γ˜ = 1/2δ = 0.10, Lc first increases (stigmatization is high)
and as γ gets closer to the threshold value γ˜, it starts decreasing (stigmatization
starts decreasing).
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The rate of technological progress is governed by the equation γ = ελ(1−δγ+δ2γ2).
Let analyze the function φ(γ) = γ − ελ(1− δγ + δ2γ2).
We have a quadratic equation in γ that has either no real root or two real roots.
Hence, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium
value of γ (that solves φ(γ) = γ − ελ(1 − δγ + δ2γ2) = 0) is that the discriminant
∆ of this quadratic equation be positive:
∆ = ((1 + ελδ)2 − 4ε2λ2δ2 > 0
⇔ ε < 1
λδ
which is always the case under assumption 5:
ελ <
1
1− δ + δ2 =
1
(1− δ)2 + δ <
1
δ
Among the two possible real roots, only one is strictly positive and acceptable
as an equilibrium growth rate. This solution writes:
γ̂ =
1 + ελδ +∆1/2
2ελδ2
where ∆ is the discriminant defined above.
To further ensure that the equilibrium growth rate γ̂ lies in the interval (0, 1),
let analyze the following equations:
φ(0) = −ελ < 0, φ(1) = 1− ελ(1− δ + δ2)
φ
′
(γ) = 1 + ελδ − 2δ2ελγ, φ′(0) = 1 + ελδ > 0
φ
′′
(γ) = − 2ελδ2 < 0
Under assumption 5, ε < 1
λ(1−δ+δ2) , we get: φ(1) = 1 − ελ(1 − δ + δ2) > 0.
Furthermore,
ελ <
1
1− δ + δ2 =
1
(1− δ)2 + δ <
1
δ
and
ελ <
1
δ
⇒ 1 + 1
ελδ
> 2
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Finally, under assumption 1, 0 < δγ < 1⇒ 2δγ < 2, we therefore get
2δγ < 2 < 1 +
1
ελδ
⇒ 1 + ελδ − 2δ2ελδ > 0⇔ φ′(γ) > 0
In sum, we have shown that under assumption 1 and 5, the equation governing
the rate of technological progress φ(γ) = γ − ελ(1− δγ + δ2γ2) is such that:
φ(0) < 0, φ(1) > 0, φ
′
(γ) > 0, φ
′
(0) > 0, φ
′′
(γ) < 0
Hence, the rate of technical change γ̂ that solves φ(γ) = 0 exists, is unique and
such that γ̂ ∈ (0, 1).
To illustrate the static comparative of γ̂ with respect to the parameters of the
model, some numerical simulations are reported below. The parameters values are
then given as follows: α = 0.97, δ = 5, κ = 1. The variable ε˜ corresponds to the
threshold level defined in assumption 5: ε < ε˜ ≡ 1
λ(1−δ+δ2)
Table I: Rates of technological change for different values of λ, δ and ε
δ λ ε˜ ε γ
2 0.9 0.37 0.3 0.204
5 0.9 0.053 0.03 0.024
20 0.9 0.003 0.029 0.0025
5 0.9 0.053 0.05 0.038
5 0.8 0.059 0.05 0.034
5 0.8 0.059 0.03 0.021
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